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ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF LEARNING IN GAMES WITH
STOCHASTICALLY PERTURBED PAYOFF OBSERVATIONS
MARIO BRAVO AND PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS
Abstract. We study a general class of game-theoretic learning dynamics in
the presence of random payoff disturbances and observation noise, and we
provide a unified framework that extends several rationality properties of the
(stochastic) replicator dynamics and other game dynamics. In the unilateral
case, we show that the stochastic dynamics under study lead to no regret,
irrespective of the noise level. In the multi-player case, we find that dominated
strategies become extinct (a.s.) and strict Nash equilibria remain stochastically
asymptotically stable – again, independently of the perturbations’ magnitude.
Finally, we establish an averaging principle for 2-player games and we show
that the empirical distribution of play converges to Nash equilibrium in zero-
sum games under any noise level.
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2 M. BRAVO AND P. MERTIKOPOULOS
1. Introduction
The objective of learning in games is to reach a rationally acceptable state (such
as a Nash equilibrium or a state where no dominated strategies are present) via
a simple, dynamic process. To that end, one of the most widely studied learning
processes is the exponential weight (EW) algorithm that was originally introduced
by Vovk (1990) and Littlestone and Warmuth (1994) in the context of multi-armed
bandit problems. In a game-theoretic setting, the algorithm simply prescribes that
players score their actions based on their cumulative payoffs and then assign choice
probabilities proportionally to the exponential of each action’s score. As such, the
EW algorithm in continuous time (Sorin, 2009) is described by the (deterministic)
dynamics:
y˙kα = vkα,
xkα =
exp(ykα)∑
β exp(ykβ)
,
(EW)
where vkα denotes the payoff to the α-th action of player k, ykα is its performance
score (cumulative payoff) and xkα is the corresponding mixed strategy weight.
A simple differentiation reveals that the evolution of the players’ mixed strategies
under (EW) is governed by the (multi-population) replicator dynamics of Taylor
and Jonker (1978):
x˙kα = xkα
[
vkα −
∑
β
xkβvkβ
]
. (RD)
The replicator equation is one of the most widely studied dynamical systems for
population evolution under selection and its rationality properties have attracted
significant interest in the literature. Akin (1980), Nachbar (1990) and Samuel-
son and Zhang (1992) showed that dominated strategies become extinct under
(EW)/(RD) while it is well known that a) Lyapunov stable states are Nash; b) strict
Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable; and c) time averages of replicator or-
bits converge to equilibrium in 2-player games provided that no strategy share be-
comes arbitrarily small (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). More recently, Sorin (2009)
showed that the single-player version of (EW)/(RD) is also universally consistent,
i.e. players have no regret for following (EW) instead of any other fixed strategy
(Fudenberg and Levine, 1995).
In this paper, we consider a broad class of reinforcement learning processes ob-
tained by replacing the exponential map in (EW) by an arbitrary perturbed (or
regularized) best response map that reinforces strategies with higher scores (Fu-
denberg and Levine, 1998; Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Leslie and Collins, 2005;
Shalev-Shwartz, 2011). In a deterministic context, the long-term behavior of the re-
sulting dynamics was studied recently by Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2014) who
extended the rationality properties of the replicator dynamics to this much broader
setting. However, a key assumption underlying all these deterministic considera-
tions is that the players’ payoffs are impervious to exogenous fluctuations and that
players possess perfect observations thereof. These requirements are rarely met in
practical applications of game theory (e.g. in wireless communications and traffic
engineering), so our goal is to investigate the robustness of this general learning
scheme in the presence of stochastic payoff perturbations and observation noise.
In a biological setting (where payoffs measure a species’ reproductive fitness),
Fudenberg and Harris (1992) introduced a stochastic variant of the replicator dy-
namics where evolution is perturbed by “aggregate shocks” reflecting the impact of
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weather-like effects and other fluctuations in the species’ habitat – see also Khas-
minskii and Potsepun (2006) for a Stratonovich-based model and Vlasic (2012) for
the case of random semimartingale jumps incurred by catastrophic, earthquake-like
events. In this framework, Cabrales (2000), Imhof (2005) and Hofbauer and Imhof
(2009) showed that dominated strategies are still eliminated if the variability of the
shocks across different genotypes (strategies) is not too high; likewise, Imhof (2005)
and Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) showed that strict Nash equilibria are stochastically
asymptotically stable under similar “mild noise” requirements.
On the other hand, Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010) showed that the repli-
cator dynamics with aggregate shocks do not coincide with the stochastic replicator
dynamics induced by (EW) in the presence of random disturbances and measure-
ment noise. Surprisingly, this learning variant of the stochastic replicator dynam-
ics retains the rationality properties of its deterministic counterpart without any
caveats on the noise: dominated strategies become extinct and strict Nash equi-
libria remain stochastically asymptotically stable irrespective of the perturbations’
magnitude.
In this paper, we show that the robustness of (EW) in the presence of noise is a
special case of a much more general learning principle that also extends the recent
deterministic results of Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2014) to a broader, stochastic
setting. In Section 2, we present our stochastically perturbed reinforcement learning
model and we derive the system of coupled stochastic differential equations (SDEs)
that governs the evolution of the players’ mixed strategies. In Section 3, we show
that these dynamics lead to no regret in a unilateral setting, whatever the noise
level. In Section 4, we investigate dominated strategies: we show that dominated
strategies become extinct (a.s.) and we derive an explicit bound for the probability
(and corresponding first passage time) that a pure dominated strategy is above a
given level. Section 5 focuses on the dynamics’ long-term stability and convergence
properties: we show that a) stochastically (Lyapunov) stable states and states that
attract trajectories of play with positive probability are Nash; and b) strict Nash
equilibria are stochastically asymptotically stable, irrespective of the fluctuations’
magnitude. Finally, in Section 6, we provide an averaging principle for 2-player
games in the spirit of Hofbauer, Sorin, and Viossat (2009). This principle allows
us to show that empirical distributions of play converge to Nash equilibrium in
zero-sum games (again, no matter the noise level).
1.1. Notation and preliminaries. If V is a vector space, we will write V ∗ for its
dual and 〈y|x〉 for the pairing between x ∈ V and y ∈ V ∗. The real space spanned
by the finite set S = {sα}d+1α=1 will be denoted by RS and its canonical basis by
{es}s∈S. In a slight abuse of notation, we will also use α to refer interchangeably to
either sα or eα and we will write δαβ for the Kronecker delta symbols on S. The set
∆(S) of probability measures on S will be identified with the d-dimensional simplex
∆ = {x ∈ RS : ∑α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0} of RS and the relative interior of ∆ will
be denoted by ∆◦. For simplicity, if {Sk}k∈N is a finite family of finite sets, we use
the shorthand (αk;α−k) for the tuple (. . . , αk−1, αk, αk+1, . . . ) and we write
∑k
α
for
∑
α∈Sk . Finally, we suppress the dependence of the law of a process X(t) on its
initial condition X(0) = x and we write P instead of Px.
A finite game in normal form is a tuple G ≡ G(N,A, u) consisting of a) a finite
set of players N = {1, . . . , N}; b) a finite set Ak of actions (or pure strategies) per
player k ∈ N; and c) the players’ payoff functions uk : A → R, where A ≡
∏
k Ak
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denotes the set of all joint action profiles (α1, . . . , αN ). The set of mixed strategies
of player k is denoted by Xk ≡ ∆(Ak) and the space X ≡
∏
k Xk of mixed strategy
profiles x = (x1, . . . , xN ) is called the game’s strategy space. Unless mentioned
otherwise, we will write Vk ≡ RAk and V ≡
∏
k Vk
∼= R
∐
kAk for the ambient
spaces of Xk and X respectively.
The expected payoff of player k in the strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X is
uk(x) =
∑1
α1
· · ·
∑N
αN
uk(α1, . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · · xN,αN , (1.1)
where uk(α1, . . . , αN ) denotes the payoff of player k in the profile (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ A.
Accordingly, the payoff corresponding to α ∈ Ak in the mixed profile x ∈ X is
vkα(x) =
∑1
α1
· · ·
∑N
αN
uk(α1, . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · · δαk,α · · · xN,αN , (1.2)
and we have
uk(x) =
∑k
α
xkαvkα(x) = 〈vk(x)|xk〉 (1.3)
where vk(x) = (vkα(x))α∈Ak denotes the payoff vector of player k at x ∈ X. In
the above, vk is treated as a dual vector in V ∗k that is paired to the mixed strategy
xk ∈ Xk; on account of this duality, mixed strategies will be regarded throughout
this paper as primal variables and payoff vectors as duals.
2. Reinforcement Learning with Noisy Observations
In this section, we introduce the class of stochastic game dynamics under study
and we discuss some of their main properties.
2.1. The deterministic case. Consider a general reinforcement learning process
where, at each t ≥ 0, every player of a finite game G ≡ G(N,A, u) employs an
“approximate” best response to the vector of his cumulative payoffs up to time t.
Specifically, this corresponds to the deterministic continuous-time process
yk(t) =
∫ t
0
vk(x(s)) ds,
xk(t) = Qk(ηk(t)yk(t)),
(RL)
where:
(1) the score vector yk(t) ∈ V ∗k ranks strategies α ∈ Ak based on their cumu-
lative payoffs up to time t.
(2) Qk : V ∗k → Xk is a regularized best response (or choice)map which reinforces
strategies with higher scores (see below for a rigorous definition).
(3) ηk(t) > 0 is a learning parameter which can be tuned freely by each player.
A natural choice for the “scores-to-strategies” map Qk would be the best response
correspondence yk 7→ arg maxxk∈Xk 〈yk|xk〉, i.e. to greedily assign all weight to the
strategy (or strategies) with the highest score. However, since the arg max operator
is multi-valued, we will focus on choice maps of the general form
Qk(yk) = arg max
xk∈Xk
{〈yk|xk〉 − hk(xk)}, yk ∈ V ∗k , (2.1)
where the penalty function hk : Xk → R satisfies the following properties:
a) hk is continuous on Xk.
b) hk is smooth on the relative interior of every face of Xk.
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c) hk is strongly convex on Xk: there exists some K > 0 such that
hk(txk + (1− t)x′k) ≤ thk(xk) + (1− t)hk(x′k)− 12Kt(1− t)‖x′k − xk‖2, (2.2)
for all xk, x′k ∈ Xk and for all t ∈ [0, 1].
This “softening” of the arg max operator has a long history in game theory,
learning and optimization, and the resulting map Qk is commonly referred to as
a softmax or perturbed best response map; for an in-depth discussion, we refer
the reader to van Damme (1987), Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Hofbauer and
Sandholm (2002), Leslie and Collins (2005), Nesterov (2009), Shalev-Shwartz (2011)
and Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2014). For our immediate purposes, the key
observation is that the (strictly) concave problem (2.1) admits a unique solution
for every yk ∈ V ∗k , so Qk(yk) can be seen as a single-valued approximation of the
standard best response correspondence yk 7→ arg maxxk∈Xk 〈yk|xk〉.
Finally, regarding the learning rate parameter ηk, its role in (RL) is to tem-
per the growth of the cumulative payoff vector yk(t) so as to allow the player to
better explore his strategies (instead of prematurely reinforcing one or another).
Accordingly, with y(t) growing as O(t), we will assume throughout this paper that:
Assumption 1. ηk(t) is C1-smooth, nonincreasing and limt→∞ tηk(t) = +∞.
Previous work and examples. The cumulative reinforcement principle behind the
dynamics (RL) can be traced back to the seminal work of Vovk (1990), Littlestone
and Warmuth (1994) and Sutton and Barto (1998) on multi-armed bandit problems
in a discrete-time setting (mostly). Game-theoretic variants of (RL) have also
been studied (in both discrete and continuous time) by Fudenberg and Levine
(1995), Freund and Schapire (1999), Hopkins (2002), Leslie and Collins (2005),
Tuyls, ’t Hoen, and Vanschoenwinkel (2006), Cominetti, Melo, and Sorin (2010),
Coucheney, Gaujal, and Mertikopoulos (2014) and many others; for a systematic
account, see Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Shalev-Shwartz (2011), Mertikopoulos
and Sandholm (2014) and references therein.
Below we provide two characteristic examples of the reinforcement learning
scheme (RL) based on logit and projected best responses:
Example 2.1. The prototype penalty function on the unit d-dimensional simplex ∆
is the Gibbs (negative) entropy h(x) =
∑
α xα log xα. By a standard calculation,
the associated regularized best response is given by the so-called logit map:
Gα(y) =
exp(yα)∑
β exp(yβ)
. (2.3)
For constant η = 1, (2.3) leads to the continuous-time exponential weight algorithm
(EW) that was presented in Section 1 (Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994; Sorin, 2009;
Vovk, 1990). An easy differentiation then yields
x˙kα =
eykα y˙kα∑k
β e
ykβ
− e
ykα
∑k
β e
ykβ y˙kβ(∑k
β e
ykβ
)2 = xkα [vkα(x)−∑kβ xkβ vkβ(x)
]
, (2.4)
which is simply the (multi-population) replicator equation of Taylor and Jonker
(1978) for population evolution under natural selection. For a more thorough treat-
ment of the links between (EW) and (RD), see Rustichini (1999), Hofbauer et al.
(2009), Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2009, 2010) and references therein.
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Example 2.2. As another example, consider the quadratic penalty function h(x) =
1
2
∑
α x
2
α. This penalty function leads to the projected best response map
Π(y) = arg minx∈∆
{
〈y|x〉 − 12 ‖x‖2
}
= arg minx∈∆ ‖y − x‖2 , (2.5)
and, as was shown by Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2014), the orbits x(t) = Π(y(t))
of (RL) with projected best responses satisfy the projection dynamics
x˙kα =
{
vkα(x)− |supp(xk)|−1
∑
β∈supp(xk) vkβ(x) if xkα > 0,
0 otherwise,
(PD)
over an open dense set of times (in particular, except when the support of x(t)
changes). The dynamics (PD) were introduced in game theory by Friedman (1991)
as a geometric model of the evolution of play in population games; for a closely
related model (but with important differences), see Nagurney and Zhang (1997),
Lahkar and Sandholm (2008) and Sandholm, Dokumacı, and Lahkar (2008).
2.2. Learning in the presence of noise. A key assumption underlying the re-
inforcement learning scheme (RL) is that payoffs are impervious to any sort of
exogenous random noise and that players have access to perfect payoff observations
with which to update their cumulative payoff vectors yk. However, this assumption
is rarely met in practical applications of game-theoretic learning: for instance, in
telecommunication networks and traffic engineering, signal strength and latency
measurements are constantly subject to stochastic fluctuations which introduce
noise to the input of any learning algorithm (Kang, Kelly, Lee, and Williams, 2009;
Kelly, Maulloo, and Tan, 1998; Li, Lee, and Guo, 2004). Thus, in the rest of the
paper, we will focus on the stochastically perturbed reinforcement learning process:
dYkα = vkα(X) dt+ σkα(X) dWkα,
Xk = Qk(ηkYk),
(SRL)
where Wkα is a family of independent Wiener processes and the diffusion coeffi-
cients σkα : X→ R (assumed Lipschitz) measure the strength of the players’ payoff
observation noise.
By Proposition A.1, the regularized best response maps Qk are Lipschitz, so
(SRL) admits a unique (strong) solution Y (t) for every initial condition Y (0) ∈ V ∗;
standard arguments can then be used to show that these solutions exist for all time
(a.s.). With this in mind, our first task will be to derive the stochastic dynamics
that govern the evolution of the orbits X(t) = Q(η(t)Y (t)) of (SRL) in X. For
simplicity, following Alvarez, Bolte, and Brahic (2004), we only present here the
special case where each player’s penalty function is of the decomposable form
hk(xk) =
∑k
α
θk(xkα) (2.6)
for some strongly convex kernel function θk ∈ C0[0, 1] ∩ C3(0, 1]. We have:
Proposition 2.1. Let X(t) be an orbit of (SRL) in X and let I be an open interval
over which the support of X(t) remains constant. Then, the evolution of X(t) over
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I is governed by the stochastic differential equation
dXkα =
ηk
θ′′kα
[
vkα −Θ′′k
∑
β
vkβ
/
θ′′kβ
]
dt (2.7a)
+
ηk
θ′′kα
[
σkα dWkα −Θ′′k
∑
β
σkβ
/
θ′′kβ dWkβ
]
(2.7b)
+
η˙k
ηk
1
θ′′kα
[
θ′kα −Θ′′k
∑
β
θ′kβ
/
θ′′kβ
]
dt (2.7c)
− 1
2
1
θ′′kα
[
θ′′′kαU
2
kα −Θ′′k
∑
β
θ′′′kβ/θ
′′
kβ U
2
kβ
]
dt, (2.7d)
where all summations are taken over β ∈ supp(Xk) and:
a) θ′kα = θ
′
k(Xkα), θ
′′
kα = θ
′′
k(Xkα), and θ
′′′
kα = θ
′′′
k (Xkα).
b) Θ′′k =
(∑
β 1/θ
′′
kβ
)−1
.
c) U2kα =
(
ηk
θ′′kα
)2 [
σ2kα
(
1−Θ′′k
/
θ′′kα
)2
+
∑
β 6=α
(
Θ′′k
/
θ′′kβ
)2
σ2kβ
]
.
In particular, if limz→0+ θ′k(z) = −∞ for all k ∈ N, X(t) is an ordinary (strong)
solution of (2.7); otherwise, X(t) satisfies (2.7) on an open dense subset of [0,∞).
Remark 2.1. Even though the dynamics (2.7) appear quite complicated, each of
the constituent terms (2.7a)–(2.7d) has a relatively simple interpretation:
a) The term (2.7a) drives the process in the baseline case σ = 0, η = constant;
as such, (2.7a) recovers the deterministic reinforcement learning dynamics
studied by Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2014).
b) The diffusion term (2.7b) reflects the direct impact of the noise on (SRL).
c) The term (2.7c) is due to the variability of the players’ learning rate η so its
impact on (2.7) vanishes if η(t)→ 0 sufficiently fast.
d) Finally, the term (2.7d) is the Itô correction induced on dXk through (SRL).
Example 2.3. As we saw in Example 2.1, the replicator dynamics (RD) correspond
to the entropic kernel θ(x) = x log x. In this case, (2.7) leads to the following
stochastic variant of the replicator dynamics:
dXkα = ηkXkα
[
vkα −
∑k
β
Xkβ vkβ
]
dt
+ ηkXkα
[
σkα dWkα −
∑k
β
σkβXkβ dWkβ
]
+
η˙k
ηk
Xkα
[
logXkα −
∑k
β
Xkβ logXkβ
]
dt
+
1
2
Xkα
[
σ2kα(1− 2Xkα)−
∑k
β
σ2kβXkβ (1− 2Xkβ)
]
dt.
(SRD)
When η is constant, (SRD) is simply the stochastic replicator dynamics of exponen-
tial learning studied by Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010). On the other hand,
(SRD) should be contrasted to the evolutionary replicator dynamics with aggregate
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shocks of Fudenberg and Harris (1992):
dXkα = Xkα
[
vkα −
∑k
β
Xkβvkβ
]
dt
+Xkα
[
σkαdWkα −
∑k
β
σkβXkβ dWkβ
]
−Xkα
[
σ2kαXkα −
∑k
β
σ2kβX
2
kβ
]
dt,
(ASRD)
where Xkα denotes the population share of the α-th genotype of species k in a
multi-species environment, vkα represents its reproductive fitness, and the noise
coefficients σkα measure the impact of random weather-like effects on popula-
tion evolution – for a comprehensive account, see Cabrales (2000), Imhof (2005)
and Hofbauer and Imhof (2009); see also Khasminskii and Potsepun (2006) for a
Stratonovich-based model and Vlasic (2012) for a model that accounts for random
jump discontinuities induced by semimartingale shocks. Besides the absence of the
learning rate η, the fundamental difference between (SRD) and (ASRD) is in their
Itô correction: this term leads to a drastically different long-term behavior and
highlights an important contrast between learning and evolution in the presence of
noise.
Example 2.4. In the case of the projected reinforcement learning scheme (PD),
substituting θ(x) = x2/2 in (2.7) yields the stochastic projection dynamics:
dXkα =
[
vkα − |supp(Xk)|−1
∑
β∈supp(Xk)
vkβ
]
dt
+
[
σkα dWkα − |supp(Xk)|−1
∑
β∈supp(Xk)
σkβ dWkβ
]
+
η˙k
ηk
[
Xkα − |supp(Xk)|−1
]
dt.
(SPD)
There are two important qualitative differences between (SRD) and (SPD): first,
(SRD) holds for all t ≥ 0 whereas (SPD) describes the evolution of the solution
orbits of (SRL) only on intervals over which the support of X remains constant.
Second, the projection mapping Π of (2.5) is piecewise linear, so there is no Itô
correction in (SPD).
Proof of Proposition 2.1. For simplicity, we suppress the player index k; also, all
summation indices are assumed to run over the (constant) support A′ of X(t).
By the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for the convex problem (2.1), we
readily obtain Yα−η−1θ′(Xα) = ζ where ζ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding
to the probability constraint
∑
α∈supp(Xk)Xkα = 1. Itô’s formula then gives
dζ = dYα +
η˙
η2
θ′α dt− η−1θ′′α dXα −
1
2
η−1θ′′′α (dXα)
2 (2.8)
and hence:
dXα =
η
θ′′α
[
dYα +
η˙
η2
θ′α dt−
1
2η
θ′′′α (dXα)
2 − dζ
]
. (2.9)
Now, write dXα in the general form:
dXα = bα dt+
∑
β
cαβ dWβ , (2.10)
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where the drift and diffusion coefficients bα and cαβ are to be determined. To
do so, recall that the Wiener processes Wα are independent (in the sense that
dWα · dWβ = δαβ), so we get (dXα)2 =
∑
β c
2
αβ dt; therefore, summing (2.9) over
α ∈ A′ and solving for dζ yields:
1
Θ′′
dζ =
∑
α
1
θ′′α
[
dYα +
η˙
η2
θ′α dt−
1
2η
θ′′′α
∑
β
c2αβ dt
]
. (2.11)
Substituting this last expression in (2.9) leads to (2.7) with U2α =
∑
β c
2
αβ , so we
are left to show that U2α has the prescribed form. To that end, by comparing the
diffusion terms of (2.7) and (2.10), we get
cαβ =
η
θ′′α
[
σαδαβ − Θ
′′
θ′′β
σβ
]
, (2.12)
and hence:
U2α =
∑
β
c2αβ =
(
η
θ′′α
)2∑
β
(
σαδαβ −Θ′′σβ
/
θ′′β
)2
=
(
η
θ′′α
)2 [
σ2α
(
1−Θ′′/θ′′α)2 +∑
β 6=α
(
Θ′′
/
θ′′β
)2
σ2β
]
, (2.13)
which concludes our derivation of (2.7).
To show that the support of X(t) is piecewise constant on a dense open subset of
[0,∞), fix some α ∈ A and let A = {t : Xα(t) > 0} so that Ac = X−1α (0). Then, A is
open becauseX(t) is continuous (a.s.), so it suffices to show that A∪int(Ac) is dense
in [0,∞); however, this is trivially true because of the identity cl(A) ∪ int(Ac) =
[0,∞). Finally, if limx→0+ θ′(x) = −∞, standard convex analysis arguments show
that the (necessarily unique) solution of (2.1) lies in the relative interior of Xk
(Rockafellar, 1970, Chap. 26), so we conclude that X(t) ∈ X◦ for all t ≥ 0 by the
well-posedness of (SRL). 
3. Consistency and Regret Minimization
We begin our rationality analysis with the unilateral case where there is a single
player whose payoffs are determined by the state of his environment – which, in
turn, may evolve arbitrarily over time (including adversarially if there are other
players involved).
Specifically, following Sorin (2009), consider a decision process where, at each
t ≥ 0, the player chooses an action from a finite set A according to some mixed
strategy x(t) ∈ X ≡ ∆(A) and obtains a reward based on the (a priori unknown)
payoff vector v(t) = (vα(t))α∈A of stage t. In this context, the performance of the
strategy x(t) is measured by comparing the player’s (expected) cumulative payoff
to the payoff that he could have obtained if the state of nature were known in
advance and the player had best-responded to it. More precisely, given a (locally
integrable) stream of payoffs v(t), the player’s cumulative regret at time t is defined
as
Reg(t) = max
α∈A
∫ t
0
vα(s) ds−
∫ t
0
〈v(s)|x(s)〉 ds, (3.1)
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Figure 1. Evolution of play under (SRL) with logit (left) and
projected best responses (right) for a 2× 2 congestion game (Nash
equilibria are depicted in red; for the game’s payoffs, see the vertex
labels). For comparison purposes, we took σkα = 1 for all α ∈ Ak,
k = 1, 2, and we used the same Wiener process realization in both
cases: the orbits of projected reinforcement learning attain the
boundary of X and converge to Nash equilibrium much faster than
in the case of exponential learning.
and we say that a strategy x(t) is consistent if it leads to no (average) regret, i.e.
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
Reg(t) ≤ 0, (3.2)
or, equivalently:
Reg(t) = o(t) as t→∞. (3.3)
Remark 3.1. The notion of consistency presented above is commonly referred to as
external or universal consistency and was originally introduced in a discrete-time
context: the agent receives a payoff vector vn ∈ RA at each stage n ∈ N and,
observing the past realizations v1, . . . , vn−1, he chooses an action αn ∈ A with law
xn ∈ ∆(A). The induced process xn is then said to be externally consistent if,
on average, it earns more than any action (or expert suggestion) α ∈ A. For an
overview of the rich literature surrounding the topic, see Fudenberg and Levine
(1998), Hart and Mas-Colell (2000), Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), Sorin (2009),
Shalev-Shwartz (2011) and references therein.
The main question that we seek to address here is whether the perturbed rein-
forcement learning process (SRL) is consistent. Formally, with notation as before,
we will focus on the unilateral process:
dYα(t) = vα(t) dt+ σα(t) dWα(t),
X(t) = Q(η(t)Y (t)),
(SRL-U)
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where v(t) is a locally integrable stream of payoffs, W (t) is a Wiener process in
RA and the noise coefficients σα (assumed continuous and bounded) represent the
error in the player’s payoff observations. In the deterministic case (σ = 0), Sorin
(2009) proved that the unilateral variant of (EW) is consistent, a result which was
recently extended by Kwon and Mertikopoulos (2014) to (RL) run with arbitrary
regularized best responses. Below, we show that (SRL-U) is consistent even when
the player’s payoff observations are subject to arbitrarily high measurement errors:
Theorem 3.1. Assume that (SRL-U) is run with learning parameter η(t) satisfying
limt→∞ η(t) = 0 (in addition to Assumption 1). Then, (SRL-U) is consistent.
The basic idea of our proof will be to study the generating process Y (t) of
(SRL-U) as it evolves in the dual space V ∗ and to examine how far the resulting
induced trajectory X(t) = Q(η(t)Y (t)) can stray from a benchmark strategy p ∈ X.
To carry out this “primal-dual” comparison, we will consider the so-called Fenchel
coupling F : X× V ∗ → R defined as:
F (x, y) = h(x) + h∗(y)− 〈y|x〉 , (3.4)
where
h∗(y) = max
x∈X
{〈y|x〉 − h(x)} (3.5)
denotes the convex conjugate of h (Rockafellar, 1970). The terminology “Fenchel
coupling” is due to Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2014) and reflects the fact that
(3.4) collects all the terms of Fenchel’s inequality. As a result, F (x, y) is non-
negative and (strictly) convex in both arguments, so it provides a “congruity” mea-
sure between x and y which can be seen as a primal-dual analogue of the well-known
(primal-primal) Bregman divergence of h (Bregman, 1967).
Our goal will be to express the player’s regret in terms of this Fenchel coupling
and show that the latter grows sublinearly in t. To that end, we will also require
the following easy consequence of the law of the iterated logarithm:
Lemma 3.2. Let W (t) = (W1(t), . . . ,Wd+1(t)), t ≥ 0, be a Wiener processes in
Rd+1 and let Z(t) be a bounded, continuous process in Rd+1. Then:
f(t) +
∫ t
0
Z(s) · dW (s) ∼ f(t) as t→∞ (a.s.), (3.6)
whenever limt→∞ (t log log t)
−1/2
f(t) = +∞.
Proof. Let ξ(t) =
∫ t
0
Z(s) · dW (s) = ∑d+1α=1 ∫ t0 Zα(s) dWα(s). Then, the quadratic
variation ρ = [ξ, ξ] of ξ satisfies:
d[ξ, ξ] = dξ · dξ =
∑d+1
α=1
ZαZβδαβ dt ≤M dt, (3.7)
where M = supt≥0 ‖Z(t)‖2 < +∞ (recall that Z(t) is bounded by assumption).
On the other hand, by the time-change theorem for martingales (Øksendal, 2007,
Cor. 8.5.4), there exists a Wiener process W˜ (t) such that ξ(t) = W˜ (ρ(t)), and
hence:
f(t) + ξ(t)
f(t)
= 1 +
W˜ (ρ(t))
f(t)
. (3.8)
Obviously, if limt→∞ ρ(t) ≡ ρ(∞) < +∞, W˜ (ρ(∞)) will be normally distributed
so W˜ (ρ(t))/f(t) → 0 and there is nothing to show. Otherwise, if limt→∞ ρ(t) =
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+∞, the quadratic variation bound (3.7) and the law of the iterated logarithm
yield:∣∣W˜ (ρ(t))∣∣
f(t)
≤
∣∣W˜ (ρ(t))∣∣√
2ρ(t) log log ρ(t)
×
√
2Mt log logMt
f(t)
→ 0 as t→∞, (3.9)
and our claim follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Our proof hinges on the rate-adjusted Fenchel coupling
Hp ≡ 1
η
F (p, ηY ) =
1
η
· [h(p) + h∗(ηY )− 〈ηY |p〉] (3.10)
between a benchmark strategy p ∈ X and the generating process ηY . To begin
with, the Itô formula of Lemma A.3 gives:
dHp = − η˙
η
Hp dt+
1
η
〈d(ηY )|X − p〉+ 1
2η
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
η2σ2β dt
= − η˙
η
Hp dt+
η˙
η
〈Y |X − p〉 dt+ 〈dY |X − p〉+ η
2
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σ2β dt, (3.11)
so, by combining the definition of Hp with (SRL-U), we get:
dHp = − η˙
η2
[h(p)− h(X)] dt+ 〈v|X − p〉 dt
+
∑
β
(Xβ − pβ)σβ dWβ + η
2
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σ2β dt, (3.12)
where we used the fact that h∗(ηY ) = 〈ηY |X〉 − h(X) in the first line. Therefore,
the player’s cumulative regret for not playing p up to time t will be:∫ t
0
〈v(s)|p−X(s)〉 ds = Hp(0)−Hp(t) (3.13a)
−
∫ t
0
η˙(s)
η2(s)
[h(p)− h(X(s))] ds (3.13b)
+
∑
β
∫ t
0
(Xβ(s)− p)σβ(s) dWβ(s) (3.13c)
+
1
2
∑
β
∫ t
0
η(s)
∂2h∗
∂2y2β
σ2β(s) ds. (3.13d)
We now proceed to bound each term of (3.13) by a sublinear function:
a) Since Hp ≥ 0, the term (3.13a) is bounded from above by Hp(0), a constant.
b) For the second term, let R =
√
2 maxx,x′∈X{h(x)− h(x′)} denote the so-called
h-radius of X (Nesterov, 2009). Then, h(p)− h(X(s)) ≤ R2/2 and hence:
(3.13b) ≤ −R
2
2
∫ t
0
η˙(s)
η2(s)
ds =
R2
2
(
1
η(t)
− 1
η(0)
)
= o(t) (3.14)
because limt→∞ tη(t) =∞ by assumption (recall also that η˙ ≤ 0).
c) For (3.13c), sublinearity follows directly from Lemma 3.2.
d) Finally, for (3.13d), recall that the Hessian of h∗(y) is equal to the inverse
Hessian of h(x), suitably restricted to the affine hull of the face of the simplex
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spanned by x = Q(y) – see e.g. Chap. 26 in Rockafellar (1970). Thus, given
that h is K-strongly convex, (2.2) readily yields ∂2h∗
/
∂y2β ≤ K−1, and hence:
(3.13d) ≤ |A|
2K
σ2max
∫ t
0
η(s) ds, (3.15)
where σ2max = supt≥0 maxβ σ2β(t). L’Hôpital’s rule then yields t
−1 ∫ t
0
η(s) ds ∼
η(t)→ 0, so (3.13d) is also sublinear in t.
Combining all of the above, we conclude that
Reg(t) = max
p∈X
∫ t
0
〈v(s)|p−X(s)〉 ds = o(t), (3.16)
i.e. (SRL-U) is consistent. 
Theorem 3.1 posits that the player’s learning parameter decreases to 0 at a
controlled rate so that tη(t)→∞. A standard choice satisfying these desiderata is
to pick η(t) = t−γ for some γ ∈ (0, 1); in this case, we obtain the following regret
minimization rate:
Proposition 3.3. Assume that (SRL-U) is run with learning rate η(t) ∼ t−γ for
some γ ∈ (0, 1). Then:
Reg(t) =

O
(
t1−γ
)
if 0 < γ < 12 ,
O
(√
t log log t
)
if γ = 12 ,
O (tγ) if 12 < γ < 1.
(3.17)
Proof. By substituting η(t) ∝ t−γ in the bound (3.13), we get an asymptotic be-
havior of the form O(1) for (3.13a), O(tγ) for (3.13b), O(
√
t log log t) for (3.13c) (by
the law of the iterated logarithm), and O(t1−γ) for (3.13d). The bound (3.17) then
follows by identifying the dominant term in each case. 
We close this section by discussing the links of (SRL-U) with the process of
vanishingly smooth fictitious play that was recently introduced by Benaïm and
Faure (2013) in the discrete-time context described in Remark 3.1 Specifically, by
interpreting t−1
∫ t
0
v(s) ds as the payoff that a player obtains in a 2-player game
against his opponent’s empirical frequency of play (cf. Section 6), the strategy
x(t) = Q
(
η(t)
∫ t
0
v(s) ds
)
= Q
(
tη(t) · t−1
∫ t
0
v(s) ds
)
(3.18)
can be interpreted itself as a “vanishingly smooth” best response to the empirical
frequency of play of one’s opponent: it is “smooth” because the player is employing
a regularized best response map instead of the hard arg max correspondence, and
it is “vanishingly smooth” because the factor tη(t) hardens to ∞ as t → ∞ (for a
more detailed discussion, see Benaïm and Faure, 2013). In this way, (SRL-U) can
be seen as a stochastically perturbed variant of vanishingly smooth fictitious play
in continuous time and Proposition 3.3 provides the analogue of Theorem 1.8 of
Benaïm and Faure (2013) in a continuous-time, stochastic setting.
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4. Extinction of Dominated Strategies
A fundamental rationality requirement for any game-theoretic learning process
is the elimination of suboptimal, dominated strategies. Formally, given a finite
game G ≡ G(N,A, u), we say that pk ∈ Xk is dominated by p′k ∈ Xk (and we write
pk ≺ p′k) if
〈vk(x)|pk〉 < 〈vk(x)|p′k〉 for all x ∈ X. (4.1)
Strategies that are iteratively dominated, undominated, or iteratively undominated
are defined similarly; also, if the strategies in question are pure, we obviously have
α ≺ β if and only if
vkα(x) < vkβ(x) for all x ∈ X. (4.2)
With this in mind, given a trajectory of play x(t) ∈ X, t ≥ 0, we say that a pure
strategy α ∈ Ak becomes extinct along x(t) if xkα(t)→ 0 as t→∞. More generally,
following Samuelson and Zhang (1992), we will say that the mixed strategy pk ∈ Xk
becomes extinct along x(t) if min{xkα(t) : α ∈ supp(pk)} → 0; otherwise, we say
that pk survives.
In a deterministic context, Akin (1980), Nachbar (1990) and Samuelson and
Zhang (1992) showed that dominated strategies become extinct under the repli-
cator dynamics (RD); this result was then extended by Mertikopoulos and Sand-
holm (2014) to the more general case of the deterministic reinforcement learning
dynamics (RL) with arbitrary regularized best response maps. In the stochastic
case, Cabrales (2000), Imhof (2005) and Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) showed that
dominated strategies are eliminated under the replicator dynamics with aggregate
shocks (ASRD), provided that the variance of the noise across different strategies is
small enough. Surprisingly however, no “small noise” condition is required for the
stochastic replicator dynamics of exponential learning: Mertikopoulos and Mous-
takas (2010) showed that the constant η variant of (SRD) eliminates dominated
strategies, irrespective of the noise level.
Our main result in this section is that this is a special case of a much more
general elimination principle:
Theorem 4.1. Let X(t) be a solution orbit of (SRL). If pk ∈ Xk is dominated
(even iteratively), then it becomes extinct along X(t) almost surely.
The basic idea of our proof will be to show that the Itô process X(t) has a
dominant drift coefficient that pushes it away from any dominated strategy pk.
However, given the complicated form of the (non-autonomous) dynamics (2.7), we
will do so indirectly, by studying the Fenchel coupling between pk ∈ Xk and the
generating process Yk(t) ∈ V ∗k .
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Suppose pk ≺ p′k so that 〈vk(x)|p′k − pk〉 ≥ mk for some
mk > 0 and for all x ∈ X. Then, if Y (t) is a solution orbit of (SRL), we get:
d 〈Yk|p′k − pk〉 = 〈dYk|p′k − pk〉 = 〈vk|p′k − pk〉 dt+
∑k
β
(p′kβ − pkβ)σkβ dWkβ
≥ mk dt+
∑k
β
(p′kβ − pkβ)σkβ dWkβ , (4.3)
or, equivalently:
〈Yk(t)|pk − p′k〉 ≥ ck +mkt+ ξk(t), (4.4)
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where ck = 〈Yk(0)|pk − p′k〉 and
ξk(t) =
∑k
β
(pkβ − p′kβ)
∫ t
0
σkβ(X(s)) dWkβ(s). (4.5)
Consider now the rate-adjusted “cross-coupling”
Vk(yk) = η
−1
k [Fk(pk, ηkyk)− Fk(p′k, ηkyk)]
= η−1k [hk(pk)− hk(p′k)]− 〈yk|pk − p′k〉 , (4.6)
with Fk : Xk × V ∗k → R is defined as in (3.4). Then, by substituting (4.4) in (4.6)
and recalling that Fk(p′k, yk) ≥ 0, we obtain:
Fk(pk, ηkYk) ≥ hk(pk)− hk(p′k) + ηk · [ck +mkt+ ξk(t)] . (4.7)
However, by Lemma 3.2, we also have mkt+ξk(t) ∼ mkt, so the RHS of (4.7) tends
to infinity as t → ∞ on account of the fact that tηk(t) → +∞ (cf. Assumption
1). In turn, this gives Fk(pk, ηk(t)Yk(t)) → +∞, so pk becomes extinct along
X(t) = Q(η(t)Y (t)) by virtue of Proposition A.1. Finally, the result for iteratively
dominated strategies follows by a standard induction argument on the rounds of
elimination of dominated strategies – see e.g. Cabrales (2000, Proposition 1A). 
Theorem 4.1 shows that dominated strategies become extinct under (SRL) but
it does not provide any information on how fast they vanish. Below we provide
a “large deviations” bound for the probability of observing a dominated strategy
above a given level at time t ≥ 0; for simplicity, we present our result in the
case where the players’ regularized best responses are derived from decomposable
penalty functions of the general form (2.6):
Proposition 4.2. Let α ∈ Ak be dominated by β ∈ Ak and assume that the
regularized best response map of player k is generated by a steep penalty function
of the decomposable form (2.6) with limx→0+ θ′k(x) = −∞. Then, for all δ > 0 and
for all large enough t ≥ 0, we have:
P (Xkα(t) > δ) ≤ 1
2
erfc
[
1
2σαβ
(
mk
√
t− Ck − θ
′
k(δ)
ηk(t)
√
t
)]
, (4.8)
where erfc(z) = 2√
pi
∫∞
z
e−t
2
dt is the complementary error function and:
a) mk = minx∈X{vkβ(x)−vkα(x)} > 0 is the minimum payoff difference between
α and β.
b) Ck is a constant that depends only on the initial conditions of (SRL).
c) σ2αβ =
1
2 maxx∈X
{
σ2kα(x) + σ
2
kβ(x)
}
> 0.
Proof. Let X(t) be a solution of (SRL) with X(0) = x ∈ X. Then, suppressing the
player index k for simplicity, we obtain:
dYα − dYβ = (vα(X)− vβ(X)) dt+ σα(X) dWα − σβ(X) dWβ
≤ −mdt− dξ, (4.9)
where ξ(t) =
∫ t
0
σβ(X(s)) dWβ(s)−
∫ t
0
σα(X(s)) dWα(s) and m is defined as above.
We thus get
Yα(t)− Yβ(t) ≤ Yα(0)− Yβ(0)−mt− ξ(t), (4.10)
so the KKT conditions for the problem (2.1) give:
θ′(Xα(t))− θ′(Xβ(t)) ≤ η(t) · [Yα(0)− Yβ(0)−mt− ξ(t)] (4.11)
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(recall that θ is steep so the solutions of (2.1) are interior). Thus, with η(t) de-
creasing, we finally get:
θ′(Xα(t)) ≤ C − η(t) · [mt+ ξ(t)] , (4.12)
where C = θ′(1) − η(0) · |Yα(0) − Yβ(0)| depends only on the initial conditions of
(SRL).
Now, if ρ = [ξ, ξ] denotes the quadratic variation of ξ (cf. the proof of Lemma
3.2), the independence of Wα and Wβ yields dρ = dξ ·dξ =
(
σ2α +σ
2
β
)
dt and hence:
ρ(t) =
∫ t
0
[
σ2α(X(s)) + σ
2
β(X(s))
]
ds ≤ 2σ2αβ t. (4.13)
Consequently, invoking the time-change theorem for martingales, let W˜ be a Wiener
process such that ξ(t) = W˜ (ρ(t)); then, combining (4.12) and (4.13), we obtain:
P (Xα(t) > δ) = P (θ′(Xα(t)) > θ′(δ))
≤ P
(
W˜ (ρ(t)) < −mt+ C − θ
′(δ)
η(t)
)
=
1
2
erfc
[
1√
2ρ(t)
(
mt− C − θ
′(δ)
η(t)
)]
. (4.14)
Since m > 0, Assumption 1 for the rate of decay of η(t) guarantees that mtη(t) >
C − θ′(δ) for large t; (4.8) then follows by substituting (4.13) in (4.14). 
Proposition 4.2 shows that P(Xkα(t) < δ) vanishes as t → ∞; in particular, by
expanding the complementary error function around t =∞, we get:
P(Xα(t) > δ) = O
(
t−1/2 exp
(−A2kt)) , (4.15)
with Ak = mk/(2σαβ). The following proposition establishes a bound for the
expected value of the corresponding hitting time:
Proposition 4.3. With notation as in Proposition 4.2, assume that (SRL) is run
with constant learning rates ηk and noisy observations with constant variance. If
τδ = inf{t > 0 : Xkα(t) ≤ δ}, then:
E[τδ] ≤
[
Ck − θ′k(δ)
]
+
ηkmk
. (4.16)
Remark 4.1. Note that the bound (4.16) is independent of the variance of the
noise in (SRL); in other words, the diffusion coefficients σ affect the probability of
observing a dominated strategy at a high share, but not its mean elimination rate.
Proof. With notation as in the proof of Proposition 4.2, let Zαβ denote the RHS
of (4.9), viz.:
dZαβ = mk dt+ σkβ dWkβ − σkα dWkα. (4.17)
Then, by (4.12), we readily obtain
τδ ≤ τ˜a ≡ inf
{
t > 0 : Zαβ(t) ≤ a
}
, (4.18)
with a = η−1k [Ck−θ′k(δ)]+ (obviously, τδ = 0 if Ck−θ′k(δ) < 0). Since Zαβ is simply
a Wiener process with drift mk, a standard argument based on Dynkin’s formula
yields E[τ˜a] = a/mk and (4.16) follows. 
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5. Long-Term Stability and Convergence Analysis
In this section, we focus on the long-term stability and convergence properties of
the stochastic reinforcement learning dynamics (SRL) with respect to equilibrium
play. To that end, recall first that a strategy profile x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium
of G ≡ G(N,A, u) if it is unilaterally stable for all players, i.e.
uk(x
∗) ≥ uk(xk, x∗−k) for all xk ∈ Xk, k ∈ N, (5.1)
or, equivalently:
vkα(x
∗) ≥ vkβ(x∗) for all k ∈ N and for all α ∈ supp(x∗k), β ∈ Ak. (5.2)
Strict equilibria are defined by requiring that (5.1) hold as a strict inequality for all
xk 6= x∗k; obviously, such equilibria are also pure in the sense that they correspond
to pure strategy profiles in A =
∏
k Ak (i.e. vertices of X).
In the noiseless case (σ = 0) with constant learning rates (η˙ = 0), Mertikopoulos
and Sandholm (2014) recently showed that the deterministic dynamics (RL) exhibit
the following properties with respect to Nash equilibria of G:
a) If a solution orbit of (RL) converges to x∗, then x∗ is Nash.
b) If x∗ ∈ X is (Lyapunov) stable, then it is also Nash.
c) Strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable in (RL).
In turn, these properties are generalizations of the long-term stability and conver-
gence properties of the (multi-population) replicator dynamics which are sometimes
referred to as the “folk theorem” of evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and Sig-
mund, 1998, 2003). That being said, the situation is quite different in the presence
of noise: for instance, interior Nash equilibria are not even traps (almost sure rest
points) of the stochastic reinforcement learning dynamics (SRL), so the ordinary
(deterministic) definitions of stability and convergence no longer apply. In the con-
text of stochastic differential equations (for an in-depth treatment, see Khasminskii,
2012), Lyapunov and asymptotic stability are defined as follows:
Definition 5.1. Let x∗ ∈ X. We will say that:
(1) x∗ is stochastically (Lyapunov) stable under (SRL) if, for every ε > 0 and
for every neighborhood U0 of x∗ in X, there exists a neighborhood U ⊆ U0
of x∗ such that
P(X(t) ∈ U0 for all t ≥ 0) ≥ 1− ε, (5.3)
whenever X(0) ∈ U .
(2) x∗ is stochastically asymptotically stable under (SRL) if it is stochastically
stable and attracting: for every ε > 0 and for every neighborhood U0 of x∗
in X, there exists a neighborhood U ⊆ U0 of x∗ such that
P (X(t) ∈ U0 for all t ≥ 0 and limt→∞X(t) = x∗) ≥ 1− ε, (5.4)
whenever X(0) ∈ U .
In the evolutionary setting of (ASRD), Imhof (2005) and Hofbauer and Imhof
(2009) showed that strict Nash equilibria are stochastically asymptotically stable
provided that the variability of the shocks across different strategies is small enough.
More recently, in a learning context, Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010) showed
that the same holds for the stochastic replicator dynamics (SRD) of exponential
learning (with constant η), irrespective of the variance of the observation noise.
However, this last result relies heavily on the properties of the logit map (2.3) and
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the specific form of the infinitesimal generator of (SRD). In our case, the convoluted
(and non-autonomous) form of the stochastic dynamics (2.7) complicates things
considerably, so such an approach does not seem possible. Nonetheless, by working
directly on the dual space V ∗, we obtain the following general result:
Theorem 5.2. Let X(t) be a solution orbit of (SRL) and let x∗ ∈ X. Then:
(1) If P (limt→∞X(t) = x∗) > 0, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
(2) If x∗ is stochastically (Lyapunov) stable, it is also Nash.
(3) If x∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, it is stochastically asymptotically
stable under (SRL).
Contrary to the approach of Imhof (2005), Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) and
Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010), our proof does not rely on the stochastic
Lyapunov method (Khasminskii, 2012) and the infinetesimal generator of (2.7).
Instead, we take a more direct approach that relies on two auxiliary results, one
regarding the structure of (SRL) near quasi-stable points, and an estimate of the
probability that a Brownian motion intersects the line a+ bt in finite time (a text-
book application of Girsanov’s theorem).
Proposition 5.3. With notation as in Theorem 5.2, assume that every neighbor-
hood U of x∗ in X admits with positive probability a solution orbit X(t) of (SRL)
such that X(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0. Then, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If x∗ is not Nash, we must have vkα(x∗) < vkβ(x∗) for some player k ∈ N
and for some α ∈ supp(x∗k), β ∈ Ak. On that account, let U be a sufficiently small
neighborhood of x∗ in X such that vkβ(x)− vkα(x) ≥ mk for some mk > 0 and for
all x ∈ U . Then, conditioning on the positive probability event that there exists an
orbit X(t) = Q(η(t)Y (t)) of (SRL) that is contained in U for all t ≥ 0, we have:
dYkα − dYkβ = (vkα(X)− vkβ(X)) dt+ σkα dWkα − σkβ dWkβ
≤ −mk dt− dξk, (5.5)
where ξk(t) is defined as in the proof of Proposition 4.2. By Lemma 3.2, it follows
that ξk(t) +mkt ∼ mkt (a.s.), so
ηk(t) ·
[
Ykα(t)− Ykβ(t)
] ≤ −mkt+ ξk(t)
t
· ηk(t)t→ −∞, (5.6)
on account of Assumption 1. Proposition A.1 then shows that Qkα(ηkYk(t)) → 0
as t → ∞, contradicting the assumption that X(t) ∈ U for all t (recall that α ∈
supp(x∗k)). We thus conclude that x
∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G, as claimed. 
Lemma 5.4. Let W (t) be a standard one-dimensional Wiener process and consider
the hitting time τa,b = inf{t > 0 : W (t) = a+ bt}, a, b ∈ R. Then:
P (τa,b <∞) = exp(−ab− |ab|). (5.7)
Lemma 5.4 is a textbook exercise in Girsanov’s theorem and its proof is fairly
standard; we only provide a short proof for the sake of completeness:
Proof. Let W (t) = W (t) − bt so that τa,b = inf{t > 0 : W (t) = a}. By Girsanov’s
theorem (see e.g. Øksendal, 2007, Chap. 8), there exists a probability measure Q
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such that a)W is a Brownian motion with respect to Q; and b) the Radon–Nikodym
derivative of Q with respect to P satisfies
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
(−b2t/2 + bW (t)) = exp (b2t/2 + bW (t)) , (5.8)
where Ft denotes the natural filtration of W (t). We then get
P (τa,b < t) = EP [1(τa,b < t)]
= EQ
[
1(τa,b < t) · exp(−b2t/2− bW (t))
]
= EQ
[
1(τa,b < t) · exp(−b2τa,b/2− bW (τa,b))
]
= exp(−ab)EQ
[
1(τa,b < t) · exp(−b2τa,b/2)
]
, (5.9)
and hence:
P (τa,b <∞) = lim
t→∞P (τa,b < t)
= lim
t→∞ exp(−ab)EQ
[
1(τa,b < t) · exp(−b2τa,b/2)
]
= exp(−ab)EQ
[
exp(−b2τa,b/2)
]
= exp(−ab− |ab|), (5.10)
where, in the last step above, we used the well-known expression E[exp(−λτa)] =
exp(−a√2λ) for the Laplace transform of the Brownian hitting time τa = inf{t >
0 : W (t) = a} (see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve, 1998). 
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 5.2 follow readily from Proposi-
tion 5.3 – simply note that the hypothesis of Proposition 5.3 is satisfied in both
cases. As such, we only need to show that strict Nash equilibria are stochastically
asymptotically stable under (SRL).
To that end, let x∗ = (α∗1, . . . , α∗N ) be a strict equilibrium of G and let A
∗
k ≡
Ak \{α∗k}. Moreover, for all α ∈ A∗k, set
Zkα = ηk
(
Ykα − Ykα∗k
)
, (5.11)
so that X(t) → x∗ if and only if Zkα(t) → −∞ for all α ∈ A∗k, k ∈ N (cf.
Proposition A.1).
Now, fix some tolerance ε > 0 and a neighborhood U0 of x∗ in X. Since x∗ is a
strict equilibrium of G, there exist mk > 0 and a neighborhood U ⊆ U0 of x∗ such
that
vkα∗k(x)− vkα(x) ≥ mk for all x ∈ U and for all α ∈ A∗k, k ∈ N. (5.12)
With this in mind, letM > 0 be sufficiently large so that X(t) ∈ U if Zkα(t) ≤ −M
for all α ∈ A∗k, k ∈ N (that such an M exists is again a consequence of Proposition
A.1); furthermore, with a fair degree of hindsight, assume also that
M > m−1k ηk(0)σ
2
k,max log(N/ε) for all k = 1, . . . , N , (5.13)
where σ2k,max = maxα,x σ
2
kα(x). We will show that if Zkα(0) ≤ −2M , thenX(t) ∈ U
for all t ≥ 0 and Zkα(t)→ −∞ with probability at least 1− ε.
Indeed, assume that Zkα(0) ≤ −2M in (5.11) and define the escape time:
τU = inf{t > 0 : X(t) /∈ U}. (5.14)
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The stochastic dynamics (SRL) then give:
d
(
Ykα − Ykα∗k
)
=
[
vkα − vkα∗k
]
dt+ σkα dWkα − σkα∗k dWkα∗k , (5.15)
so, for all t ≤ τU , we will have:
Zkα(t) = Zkα(0) + ηk(t)
∫ t
0
[
vkα(X(s))− vkα∗k(X(s))
]
ds+ ηk(t)ξk(t)
≤ −2M − ηk(t) [mt− ξk(t)] , (5.16)
where we have set ξk(t) =
∫ t
0
σkα(X(s)) dWkα(s)−
∫ t
0
σkα∗k(X(s)) dWkα∗k(s).
We will first show that P(τU <∞) ≤ ε. To that end, note that the time-change
theorem for martingales (Øksendal, 2007, Cor. 8.5.4) provides a standard Wiener
process W˜k(t) such that ξk(t) = W˜k(ρk(t)) where ρk = [ξk, ξk] is the quadratic
variation of ξk. Then, from the fact that η is nonincreasing, we conclude that
Zkα(t) ≤ −M whenever mkt− W˜k(ρk(t)) ≥ −M/ηk(0).
Accordingly, with ρk(t) ≤ 2σ2k,maxt (cf. the proof of Proposition 4.2), it suffices
to show that the hitting time
τ0 = inf
{
t > 0 : W˜k(t) =
mkt
2σ2k,max
+
M
ηk(0)
for some k ∈ N
}
(5.17)
is finite with probability not exceeding ε. However, if a trajectory of W˜k(t) has
W˜k(t) ≤ mkt/(2σ2k,max) +M/ηk(0) for all t ≥ 0, we will also have
W˜k(ρk(t)) ≤ mkρk(t)
2σ2k,max
+
M
ηk(0)
≤ mkt+ M
ηk(0)
, (5.18)
so τU must be infinite for every trajectory of W˜ = (W˜1, . . . , W˜N ) with infinite τ0,
i.e. P(τU < +∞) ≤ P(τ0 < +∞). Thus, if we write Ek for the event that W˜k(t) ≥
mkt/(2σ
2
k,max) +M/ηk(0) for some finite t ≥ 0, Lemma 5.4 yields P(Ek) = e−λkM
with λk = mk/(ηk(0)σ2k,max), and we obtain:
P(τ0 < +∞) = P
(⋃
k
Ek
)
≤
∑
k
P(Ek) =
∑
k
e−λkM ≤ ε, (5.19)
by construction ofM . In view of the above, by conditioning on the event τU = +∞
and invoking Assumption 1 and Lemma 3.2, Eq. (5.16) finally yields
Zkα(t) ≤ −2M − ηk(t) ·
[
mt− ξk(t)
] ∼ −ηk(t) ·mt→ −∞ (a.s.). (5.20)
We conclude that Zkα(t) → −∞ for all α ∈ A∗k, k ∈ N, so limt→∞X(t) = x∗
(conditionally a.s.) and our proof is complete. 
Remark 5.1. By considering the modified game G˜ with noise-adjusted payoff func-
tions v˜kα(x) = vkα(x)− 12σ2kα, the above reasoning yields an alternative proof of the
stability and convergence results of Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) for the replicator
dynamics with aggregate shocks (ASRD).
6. An Averaging Principle for 2-Player Games
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the players’ empirical
distribution of play
X¯(t) =
1
t
∫ t
0
X(s) ds, (6.1)
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and we establish an averaging principle for (SRL) in 2-player games. Our analysis
is motivated by the original deterministic results of Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998)
who showed that X¯(t) converges to Nash equilibrium under the replicator dynam-
ics whenever lim inft→∞Xkα(t) > 0 for all α ∈ Ak, k = 1, 2 (see also Hofbauer
et al., 2009). More recently, Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2014) proved a version
of this result for arbitrary regularized best response maps (always in a determin-
istic setting), while Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) showed that the time-averages of
the aggregate-shocks replicator dynamics (ASRD) converge to the Nash set of a
modified game (cf. Remark 5.1 above).
Our main result here is that the averaging principle of Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1998) extends to the perturbed reinforcement learning scheme (SRL), even in the
presence of arbitrarily large payoff observation errors:
Theorem 6.1. Let G be a 2-player game and let X(t) be a solution orbit of the
stochastic dynamics (SRL). If the players’ score differences Ykα(t) − Ykβ(t) grow
sublinearly with t for all α, β ∈ Ak, k = 1, 2, then the empirical distribution of play
converges almost surely to the set of Nash equilibria of G.
Remark 6.1. In the case of (EW)/(RD), the sublinear growth requirement for
Ykα − Ykβ boils down to the permanency condition lim inft→∞Xkα(t) > 0, so we
recover the original result of Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998).
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Pick α, β ∈ Ak. Then, by the definition of the dynamics
(SRL), we get:
Ykα(t)− Ykβ(t) = Ykα(0)− Ykβ(0) +
∫ t
0
[vkα(X(s))− vkβ(X(s))] ds
+
∫ t
0
σkα(X(s)) dWkα(s)−
∫ t
0
σkβ(X(s)) dWkβ(s)
= ck + ξk(t) + t
[
vkα(X¯(t))− vkβ(X¯(t))
]
, (6.2)
where ck = Ykα(0)−Ykβ(0), ξk(t) denotes the martingale part of (6.2) and we have
used the fact that vk(x) is linear in x (and not only multilinear). Dividing by t and
using Lemma 3.2 then yields
lim
t→∞
[
vkα(X¯(t))− vkβ(X¯(t))
]
= 0 (a.s.), (6.3)
so vkα(x∗) = vkβ(x∗) whenever x∗ is an ω-limit of X¯(t). This shows that any ω-
limit of X¯(t) is Nash, and since the ω-set of X¯(t) is nonempty (by compactness of
X), our claim follows. 
Of course, the applicability of Theorem 6.1 is limited by the growth requirement
for Ykα(t)−Ykβ(t). The following proposition shows that this condition always holds
in 2-player zero-sum games under the additional assumption limt→∞ ηk(t) = 0:
Proposition 6.2. Let G be a 2-player zero-sum game and assume that (SRL) is
run with ηk(t) satisfying limt→∞ ηk(t) = 0 (in addition to Assumption 1). Then,
the empirical distribution of play under (SRL) converges almost surely to the set of
Nash equilibria of G.
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Proof. Let p = (p1, p2) be an interior Nash equilibrium of G and let Fp(t) =∑
k=1,2 Fk(pk, ηk(t)Yk(t)). Using the Itô formula of Lemma A.3, we get:
dFp =
∑
k,β
(Xkβ − pkβ) d(ηkYk) + 1
2
∑
k,β
∂2h∗k
∂y2kβ
η2kσ
2
kβ dt
=
∑
k=1,2
η˙k 〈Yk|Xk − p〉 dt (6.4a)
+
∑
k=1,2
ηk 〈vk|Xk − pk〉 dt (6.4b)
+
∑
k,β
ηk(Xkβ − pkβ)σkβ dWkβ (6.4c)
+
1
2
∑
k,β
∂2h∗k
∂y2kβ
η2kσ
2
kβ dt, (6.4d)
where we substituted dY from (SRL) to obtain (6.4b) and (6.4c).
We now claim that Fp(t) grows sublinearly in t; indeed:
a) Lemma 3.2 shows that Y (t) = O(t), so there exist Mk > 0, k = 1, 2, such that∑
k=1,2
∫ t
0
η˙k(s) 〈Xk(s)− p|Yk(s)〉 ds ≤
∑
k=1,2
Mk
∫ t
0
|η˙k(s)| s ds = o(t), (6.5)
where the sublinearity estimate follows from Assumption 1 and the fact that
ηk(t)→ 0: ∫ t
0
η˙k(s)s ds = ηk(t)t−
∫ t
0
ηk(s) ds = o(t). (6.6)
b) The term (6.4b) is identically zero because G is zero-sum and p is an interior
equilibrium of G:
〈v1(X)|X1 − p1〉+ 〈v2(X)|X2 − p2〉
= u1(X1, X2)− u1(p1, X2) + u2(X1, X2)− u2(X1, p2) = 0. (6.7)
c) The term (6.4c) is sublinear (a.s.) on account of (the proof of) Lemma 3.2.
d) Finally, for (6.4d), the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 yields:
1
2
∑
k,β
∫ t
0
∂2h∗k
∂y2kβ
η2k(s)σ
2
kβ(X(s)) ds ≤
1
2K
∑
k,β
σ2k,max
∫ t
0
η2k(s) ds, (6.8)
with σ2k,max = maxα∈Ak maxx∈X σ
2
kα(x) defined as in the proof of Theorem 5.2.
Since ηk(t)→ 0, this last integral is also sublinear in t, as claimed.
Assume now that lim supt→∞ Fp(t) ≥ m for some m > 0 (otherwise we would
have the stronger result X(t) → p). Then, Lemma A.2 gives |Ykα(t) − Ykβ(t)| =
O(Fp(t)) = o(t), so our claim follows from Theorem 6.1. 
Remark 6.2. We should note here that if players employ a constant learning param-
eter ηk, the term (6.4a) vanishes identically and only the Itô correction of (6.4) can
lead to a linear growth for Ykα − Ykβ . This explains why the deterministic results
of Hofbauer et al. (2009) and Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2014) do not require
a vanishing learning parameter; for an alternate approach covering the constant η
case, see Theorem 6.3 below.
LEARNING IN GAMES WITH NOISY PAYOFF OBSERVATIONS 23
We close this section by linking the long-term behavior of time-averaged orbits
of (SRL) to the deterministic best response dynamics of Gilboa and Matsui (1991):
x˙k ∈ brk(x)− xk, (BRD)
where brk(x) ≡ arg maxx′k∈Xk〈vk(x)|x′k〉 denotes the standard (non-regularized)
best response correspondence of player k. Hofbauer et al. (2009) then showed that
the ω-limit set Ω of time-averaged solutions of (RD) is internally chain transi-
tive (ICT) under (BRD), i.e. any two points in Ω may be joined by a piecewise
continuous “chain” of arbitrarily long orbit segments of (BRD) in Ω broken by arbi-
trarily small jump discontinuities (in particular, ICT sets are invariant, connected
and have no proper attractors; for a full development, see Benaïm, Hofbauer, and
Sorin, 2005).
Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2014) subsequently established a more general
averaging principle linking the deterministic reinforcement learning scheme (RL)
to (BRD). Importantly, as we show below, the stochastic dynamics (SRL) share
the same connection to the deterministic best response dynamics (BRD), despite
all the noise:
Theorem 6.3. Let X(t) be a solution orbit of (SRL) for a 2-player game G.
Then, the ω-limit set of the empirical distribution of play X¯(t) is internally chain
transitive under the deterministic best response dynamics (BRD).
Proof. Our proof follows the approach of Hofbauer et al. (2009). Specifically, from
(SRL), we have:
Yk(t) = Yk(0) +
∫ t
0
vk(X(s)) ds+
∫ t
0
σk(X(s)) dWk(s)
= tvk(X¯(t)) + Yk(0) + ξk(t), (6.9)
where we have set ξkα(t) =
∫ t
0
σkα(X(s)) dWkα(s) and we have used the fact that
G is a 2-player game in order to carry the integral inside the argument of vk.
Consequently, by the definition (2.1) of the players’ regularized best response maps,
Xk(t) = Qk(ηk(t)Yk(t)) solves the (strictly) concave maximization problem:
maximize 〈vk(X¯(t))|xk〉+ 1
t
〈Yk(0) + ξk(t)|xk〉 − 1
tηk(t)
hk(xk),
subject to xk ∈ Xk.
(6.10)
By Lemma 3.2 and Assumption 1, the last two terms of (6.10) vanish as t→ 0.
Hence, by the maximum theorem of Berge (1997, p. 116), it follows that Xk(t) lies
within a vanishing distance of arg maxxk∈Xk〈vk(X¯(t))|xk〉 ≡ brk(X¯(t)). On the
other hand, differentiating X¯(t) yields:
d
dt
X¯(t) = t−1X(t)− t−2
∫ t
0
X(s) ds = t−1
[
X(t)− X¯(t)] , (6.11)
and, after changing time to τ = log t, the expression above becomes ddtX¯(t) =
X − X¯. Combining all of the above, we conclude that X¯(t) tracks a perturbed
version of the best reply dynamics (BRD) in the sense of Benaïm et al. (2005,
Def. III), and our assertion follows from Theorem 3.6 in the same paper. 
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(a) A sample trajectory and its time average.
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(b) Distribution of time averages at time T .
Figure 2. Time averages of (SRL) with logit best responses in
a game of Matching Pennies (as in Fig. 1, Nash equilibria are
depicted in red and the game’s payoff’s are displayed inline; for
benchmarking purposes, we also took σkα = 1 for all α ∈ Ak,
k = 1, 2). Fig. 2(a) shows the evolution of a sample trajectory
and its time average; in Fig. 2(b), we show a density plot of the
distribution of 104 time-averaged trajectories for different values
of the integration horizon T . In tune with Proposition 6.2, we see
that time averages converge to the game’s Nash equilibrium.
Thanks to Theorem 6.3, several conclusions of Hofbauer et al. (2009) for 2-player
games can be readily generalized to the full stochastic setting of (SRL) simply by
exploiting the properties of the deterministic dynamics (BRD):
(1) If the empirical distribution of play converges under (SRL), its limit is
Nash.
(2) Any global attractor of (BRD) also attracts the time averages of (SRL),
independently of the noise level. In particular, since the set of Nash equilib-
ria is globally attracting under (BRD) in zero-sum games, this observation
extends Proposition 6.2 to the constant η case.
(3) The only ICT sets of (BRD) in potential games consist of (isolated) compo-
nents of Nash equilibria. Thus, combining Theorems 5.2 and 6.3, it follows
that (SRL) converges to the set of strict Nash equilibria in 2-player potential
games.
Appendix A. Properties of the Fenchel Coupling
In this appendix, we collect some basic properties of the Fenchel coupling and
regularized best response maps. To state them, let ∆ denote the d-dimensional
simplex of V ≡ Rd+1 and let h : ∆ → R be a penalty function on ∆ (i.e. h is
continuous and strongly convex on ∆ and smooth on the relative interior of any
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face of ∆). Also, recall that the regularized best response map Q : V ∗ → ∆ induced
by h is given by
Q(y) = arg max
x∈∆
{〈y|x〉 − h(x)}, y ∈ V ∗, (A.1)
while the Fenchel coupling between p ∈ ∆ and y ∈ V ∗ is defined as:
F (p, y) = h(p) + h∗(y)− 〈y|p〉 , (A.2)
where
h∗(y) = max
x∈∆
{〈y|x〉 − h(x)} (A.3)
denotes the convex conjugate of h. We then have:
Proposition A.1. Let h : ∆→ R be a penalty function on ∆ with strong convexity
constant K. Then:
(1) Q is 1/K-Lipschitz and Q(y) = dh∗(y) for all y ∈ V ∗.
(2) If yα − yβ → −∞ for some β 6= α, then Qα(y)→ 0.
(3) F (p, y) ≥ 12 ‖Q(y)− p‖2 for all p ∈ ∆ and for all y ∈ V ∗; in particular,
F (p, y) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if p = Q(y).
(4) If F (p, yn) → +∞ for some sequence yn ∈ V ∗, the sequence xn = Q(yn)
converges to the union of faces of ∆ that do not contain p; in particular,
lim infn→+∞{xn,α : α ∈ supp(p)} = 0.
Proof. The first part of Proposition A.1 is well known (see e.g. Nesterov, 2009;
Shalev-Shwartz, 2011); the rest of our claims are due to Mertikopoulos and Sand-
holm (2014), but we provide a proof for the sake of completeness.
Part 2. Let yn be a sequence in V ∗ such that yn,α − yn,β → −∞, set xn = Q(yn)
and assume (by descending to a subsequence if necessary) that xn,α > ε > 0 for all
n. By definition, we have 〈yn|xn〉 − h(xn) ≥ 〈yn|x′〉 − h(x′) for all x′ ∈ ∆, so if we
set x′n = xn + ε(eβ − eα), we readily obtain
ε(yn,α − yn,β) ≥ h(xn)− h(x′n) ≥ −(hmax − hmin). (A.4)
This contradicts our original assumption that yn,α − yn,β → −∞; since ∆ is com-
pact, we get x∗α = 0 for any limit point x∗ of xn, i.e. Qα(yn)→ 0.
Part 3. Let x = Q(y) so that h∗(y) = 〈y|x〉 − h(x) and F (p, y) = h(p) − h(x) −
〈y|p− x〉. Since x = dh∗(y) by Part 1, we will also have
〈y|x′ − x〉 ≤ h(x′)− h(x) for all x′ ∈ ∆, (A.5)
by standard convex analysis arguments (Rockafellar, 1970, Chap. 26). On the other
hand, letting z = p− x, the definition (2.2) of strong convexity yields:
h(x+ tz) ≤ th(p) + (1− t)h(x)− 12Kt(1− t) ‖z‖2 for all t ∈ (0, 1). (A.6)
Hence, combining (A.6) with (A.5) for x′ = x+ tz, we get
h(x) + 〈y|tz〉 ≤ th(p) + (1− t)h(x)− 12Kt(1− t) ‖z‖2 , (A.7)
and, after rearranging and dividing by t, we obtain
F (p, y) = h(p)− h(x)− 〈y|z〉 ≥ 12K(1− t) ‖z‖2 . (A.8)
Our claim then follows by letting t→ 0+ in (A.8).
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Part 4. Let Λp denote the union of faces of ∆ that do not contain p and set ∆p ≡
∆ \Λp. Then, if x = Q(y) ∈ ∆p for some y ∈ V ∗, the function h(x+ t(p− x)) will
be finite and smooth for all t in a neighborhood of 0 (simply note that x+ t(p− x)
lies in the relative interior of the same face of ∆ for small t). This implies that h
admits a two-sided derivative at x along p − x, so we will also have 〈y|p− x〉 =
h′(x; p−x) < +∞ by Theorem 23.5 in Rockafellar (1970); in particular, this shows
that F (p, y) = h(p)− h(x)− h′(x; p− x) < +∞ whenever x = Q(y) ∈ ∆p.
Assume now ad absurdum that xn = Q(yn) has a limit point in ∆p, so there
exists a compact neighborhood K of p in ∆p which is visited infinitely often by xn.
By continuity and compactness, this implies that there exists some M > 0 such
that F (p, yn) = h(p)− h(xn)− h′(xn; p− xn) < M infinitely often, a contradiction
to our original assumption that F (p, yn) → +∞. We conclude that every limit
point of xn lies in ∆p, as claimed. 
For the proof of Proposition 6.2, we also require the following lemma:
Lemma A.2. Let p ∈ ∆◦ and let yn ∈ V ∗ have F (p, yn) ≥ m for some m > 0.
Then, for all α, β, there exists some K > 0 such that |yn,α − yn,β | ≤ KF (p, yn).
Proof. By descending to a subsequence if necessary, assume ad absurdum that
yn,α − yn,β ≥ KnF (p, yn) for some increasing sequence Kn → +∞. Then, by
relabeling indices (and passing to a finer subsequence if needed), we may assume
that a) yn,α ≥ yn,γ ≥ yn,β for all γ = 1, . . . , d+1; and b) the index set {1, . . . , d+1}
can be decomposed into two nonempty sets, A0 and A∞, such that yn,α − yn,γ ≤
K ′F (p, yn) for some K ′ > 0 and for all γ ∈ A0, while yn,α − yn,γ > K ′nF (p, yn) for
some K ′n → +∞ and for all γ ∈ A∞. Thus, letting xn = Q(yn), we get:
〈yn|p− xn〉 =
∑d+1
γ=1
yn,γ(pγ − xn,γ) =
∑d+1
γ=1
(yn,γ − yn,α)(pγ − xn,γ)
=
∑
γ∈A0
(yn,γ − yn,α)(pγ − xn,γ) +
∑
γ∈A∞
(yn,γ − yn,α)(pγ − xn,γ).
(A.9)
By construction, the first sum is bounded in absolute value by 2dK ′F (p, yn). As
for the second sum, since F (p, yn) ≥ M > 0, we will also have yn,α − yn,γ → +∞,
so xn,γ → 0 by Proposition A.1; with p ∈ ∆◦, we then get lim infn(pγ − xn,γ) ≥
δ for some δ > 0, so every A∞ summand in (A.9) is eventually bounded from
above by −δK ′nF (p, yn). This shows that 〈yn|p− xn〉 ≤ −K ′′nF (p, yn) for some
positive sequence K ′′n → +∞; however, 〈yn|p− xn〉 = h(p) − h(xn) − F (p, yn), a
contradiction. 
From a stochastic analysis standpoint, the importance of the Fenchel coupling is
captured by the following calculation:
Lemma A.3. Let h : ∆ → R be a penalty function on ∆ and let Q : V ∗ → ∆ and
F : ∆× V ∗ → R be defined as above. Moreover, let dYα = µα dt+
∑
β σαβ dWβ be
an Itô process with values in V ∗ and set X(t) = Q(Y (t)). Then, for all p ∈ ∆, we
have:
dF (p, Y ) =
∑
β
(Xβ − pβ) dYβ + 1
2
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σ2β dt. (A.10)
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Proof. Let H(t) = F (p, Y (t)), t ≥ 0. Then, Itô’s formula yields:
dH =
∑
β
∂F
∂yβ
dYβ +
1
2
∑
β,γ
∂2F
∂yβ∂yγ
dYβ · dYγ
=
∑
β
(
∂h∗
∂yβ
− xβ
)
dYβ +
1
2
∑
β,γ
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σβσγδβγ dt
=
∑
β
(Xβ − pβ) dYβ + 1
2
∑
β
∂2h∗
∂y2β
σ2β dt, (A.11)
where we have used the definition of F and Proposition A.1 in the second and third
lines. 
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